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ALD-161        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3541 
___________ 
 
JAMAR LONG, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FCI FAIRTON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-14-cv-03822) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 9, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 30, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Jamar Long, a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals 
from the District Court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 In 2012, Long pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland to drug and firearm offenses that stemmed from a search of his residence.  He 
did not appeal or seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Long later came to regret his guilty 
plea, believing that the evidence obtained from his residence was wrongfully procured.  
Specifically, Long argues that Detective Margulis obtained the warrant in part based on a 
false claim that Long sold him drugs.  Long claims that video evidence refutes Margulis’s 
assertion of a drug deal between them.  Accordingly, Long believes the evidence 
obtained from his residence should have been suppressed, and that this entitles him to 
relief under § 2241.  Long states that he did not seek relief under § 2255 because such a 
motion would have been untimely. 
 Long is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton, 
New Jersey, and thus he properly filed the foregoing petition in the District of New 
Jersey.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).  The District Court dismissed 
Long’s petition sua sponte, finding that he could not satisfy the stringent standard for 
seeking relief under § 2241.  Long then sought reconsideration, which the District Court 
denied.  Long timely appealed. 
3 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review 
over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
factual findings.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because this appeal does 
not present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Ordinarily, federal prisoners seeking post-conviction relief must proceed via 
§ 2255.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  However, a 
party can seek relief via a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 if he can demonstrate 
that a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”  
See § 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).  “A § 2255 motion is 
inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of 
scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing 
and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.   
 This Court has applied the safety valve where an intervening and retroactive 
change in law had decriminalized the petitioner’s underlying conduct, but he had no prior 
opportunity to challenge his conviction and could not satisfy the stringent standard for 
filing a second or successive § 2255 motion.  Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).  We have also suggested that other extraordinary 
circumstances may justify applying the safety valve.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  
Critically, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the petitioner cannot 
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satisfy § 2255’s timeliness or other gatekeeping requirements.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d at 251. 
 Under this rubric, the District Court properly dismissed Long’s § 2241 petition.  
Long does not argue that an intervening change in law made the conduct underlying his 
conviction non-criminal, nor can he make such an argument.  As such, he does not fit 
within the “narrow exception of In re Dorsainvil.”  Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120.  Nor has he 
presented any other extraordinary circumstances to justify applying the safety valve.  See 
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  Long’s only argument is that because the search warrant was 
flawed, the evidence obtained from the search of his residence should have been 
suppressed.  But even assuming that is correct, he does not argue that he is actually 
innocent of the gun and drug convictions, only that the key evidence for those 
convictions was allegedly inadmissible.  Cf. Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522-23 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“Actual innocence means ‘factual innocence, not mere legal 
insufficiency.’” (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998))).  More 
fatally, he identifies no reason why he did not raise this argument in a timely appeal or 
§ 2255 motion.  He states that he viewed the video evidence with his attorney, yet 
nothing suggests that he sought to suppress the fruits of the allegedly unlawful search at 
the appropriate time, or at any time until he filed the foregoing petition.  Accordingly, the 
District Court correctly dismissed Long’s § 2241 petition because he failed to show that 
§ 2255 was inadequate or ineffective. 
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III. 
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.   
